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Abstract 
Ring signature is one of most important type of digital signature. Usually the ring signature is generated by one 
signer, however sometimes we need the signature be generated by one subset from an access structure of a group. 
Moreover, we need to overcome the management problem of private keys in traditional signature schemes. In this 
paper, a novel biometric ring signature scheme for authorized subsets is proposed. The members of the authorized 
subsets can cooperatively sign the message based on their biometric identity and the verifier can verify if the ring 
signature is generated by one authorized subset in the access structure, however he cannot find out which authorized 
subset has really issued the signature. The analysis results show that the scheme is secure and easy to implement. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.  
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1. Introduction 
The concept of ring signature was initially proposed by Rivest et al in 2001[1]. In a ring signature 
scheme, the signer can spontaneously construct a group including himself, in which he can use his own 
private key and the public keys of all group members to sign the message, and the result signature is 
called by ring signature. 
Generally the ring signature is generated by one signer, threshold ring signature scheme extends the 
original concept in that the verifier can verify if the signature is generated by one of the threshold subsets 
of the group, however he cannot reveal the identities of the real signers. Authorized subset ring signature 
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extends the threshold ring signature furthermore, in which the valid ring signature can only be generated 
by an authorized subset of an access structure [2][3].  
The management of private keys is a main problem in above signature schemes. For security, the 
private keys of the signers are long keys and should be stored in some tamper-resistance tokens, such as 
smart cards and should be protected by a password. Since the smart cards may be lost or stolen and the 
short passwords may be easily guessed, unauthorized signature may occur. Moreover, there is no strong 
relation between the key and the user. In order to overcome such problems, the researchers considered to 
generate the signature private key by user’s biometric information. A lot of schemes of generating a 
reliable cryptologic key from biometrics have been studied. In such a key generation system, the key 
linked with biometrics which represent the physical identity of people, is not stored explicitly. Some 
auxiliary information which leak little information about the key and biometric templates is also stored to 
help recovering the key. When it is needed, the key can be recovered from the same biometrics and the 
auxiliary information in real time.  
Various biometric features such as fingerprint, face, iris, voice, key stroke have been used to generate 
biometric keys. However, there are some shortcomings in classical biometric key generation system. For 
example, face and voice recognition is not very stable, iris recognition is not very convenient, fingerprint 
and palmprint is exposed to skin surface and may be forged by attackers. Different from these traditional 
biometrics, finger veins exhibit some excellent advantages in application such as hidden inside the body 
and convenient to use [4], it gradually become a hot topic of biometric recognition.  
A novel biometric ring signature scheme for authorized subset is proposed in this paper on the basis of 
our previous ring signature scheme [3]. The signing subset firstly constructs a group including all 
members of itself, then constructs a set of subsets of the group member including itself, eventually the 
signing subset signs the message with the help of their finger vein biometrics. The verifier can verify 
whether the ring signature is issued by one of the above subsets, however cannot find out which subset 
has really signed the message. 
2. The proposed scheme 
In order to construct an authorized subset oriented biometric ring signature scheme, our main idea is as 
follows: each member of the group generates his/her signing private key with the help of his/her finger 
vein feature, after that we treat each authorized subset in the access structure as a whole which has its own 
private key and corresponding public key. Thereafter we can use the traditional method to construct the 
authorized subset oriented ring signature scheme.  
In the scheme we assume there is a secure broadcast channel among the members of the signing subset 
and all members of the signing subsets share the same discrete logarithm system. Namely both p  and q
are large primes with | 1q p − , and g  is an element in *pZ  with order q , H  is a strongly collision-free 
one way hash function. 
2.1. System Setup 
For simplicity, we note the signing subset as 1{ , , }s lU UΓ = ⋅⋅⋅ , where ( 1, , )iU i l= ⋅⋅⋅  is a group member. 
In order to generate the signature, firstly sΓ  selects a group 1{ , , }nU U U= ⋅⋅⋅  with n l> .
In order to generate the biometric private key of each member in sΓ , we firstly adopt  the similar ideas 
of Yu’s [5] to extract line feature from original finger vein images. After a series processing, we can 
obtain rough finger vein from the original image as shown in figure 1. To further extract the structure 
feature of finger vein, we thinned image (e) into binary image shown in image (f) using Zhang-Suen 
skeletonization algorithm [6]. By removing the spur of image (f), we get binary image (h). We transform 
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image (h) into a binary vector with size of 4056 firstly, then extend it to a new vector with size of 4096 by 
appending zeros at the end. We call the new vector by FVCode in our paper.  
Figure 1. Feature extraction from finger vein (a) an original finger vein image; (b) the edges of finger; (c) the cropped finger vein 
image; (d) enhanced finger vein image; (e) the sketch of finger vein; (f) the thinned sketch; (h) the final finger vein feature
In order to enhance the robustness of the FVCode, we rotate the finger vein feature (figure1 (h)) by 
2o− , 1o− , 0o , 1o  and 2o , respectively. Furthermore, the five rotated images are accumulated to one 
synthesized image. The final complex FVCode is generated from the synthesized image. The framework 
of key generation is shown in figure 2. In the enroll phase, a random binary sequence *qx Z∈  is encoded to 
4096 bits binary sequence by using BCH code. The complex FVCode of user XOR the 4096 bits binary 
sequence, the result is stored in smart card. In key generation phase, FVCode was extracted from the user, 
to overcome the rotation of finger, we rotate the finger vein image by 2o− , 1o− , 0o ,1o  and 2o to generate 
five rotated FVCodes. Each rotated FVCode XOR the template stored in the smart card. The XOR result 
is decoded by using BCH code. After BCH decoding, key 'x  can be generated. We then check whether 
( ')h x  equals ( )h x  to decide if successfully generate the right key. The five rotated FVCodes are used one 
by one for decrypt the key until success. 
Figure 2. Our proposed finger vein based key generation system 
After above process, The biometric private key of each jU U∈  is *j qx Z∈  and corresponding public 
key is  mod  jxjy g p= . After that sΓ  constructs an access structure 1{ , , }dΓ = Γ ⋅⋅⋅ Γ  with sΓ ∈Γ  and 
( 1, , )i U i dΓ ⊆ = ⋅⋅⋅ . And for each iΓ ∈Γ , iΓ  computes  
 mod 
j i
i j
U
Y y p
∈Γ
= ∏
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iY  is the public key of iΓ  and corresponding biometric private key is iX , satisfying  mod iXiY g p= .   
We can easily conclude 
 mod 
j i
i j
U
X x q
∈Γ
= ∑
2.2. Sign 
In order to sign the message m , for the signing subset 1{ , , }s lU UΓ = ⋅⋅⋅ , ( 1, , )iU i l= ⋅⋅⋅ randomly 
selects a polynomial 1,0 ,1 , 1( )
l
i i i i lf z a a z a z
−
−= + + ⋅⋅ ⋅ +  with order 1l −  , where , ( 0, , 1)i j R qa Z j l∈ = ⋅⋅⋅ −  is 
a secret parameter with , 1 0i la − ≠ . For 1, ,j l= ⋅⋅⋅ , ( 1, , )iU i l= ⋅⋅⋅  computes , ( ) mod i j im f j q= and sends 
,i jm  to ( )jU j i≠  secretly. After receiving , ( 1, , , )j im j l j i= ⋅⋅⋅ ≠  from other members of the signing 
subset, ( 1, , )iU i l= ⋅⋅⋅  computes 
,
1
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=
= ∑  , 
1
mod 
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j i
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m q
i j
δ
=
≠
−= −∏ , mod iiw g pδ=          
iU  keeps im , iδ  secret and broadcasts iw  in sΓ .
For sUπ ∈Γ  designated in advance or temporarily, Uπ  firstly computes 
1
 mod 
l
s i
i
z w p
=
=∏ , 1 1( , , , , )s d sc H Y Y m z+ = ⋅⋅⋅
For 1, , ,1, , 1i s d s= + ⋅⋅⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − , Uπ  randomly selects i R qs Z∈ , and computes  mod i is ci iz g Y p=  and 
1 1( , , , , )i d ic H Y Y m z+ = ⋅⋅ ⋅ .
In the end, Uπ  broadcasts sc  in sΓ . ( 1, , )iU i l= ⋅⋅⋅  computes ,0 mod i i s ia c x qη = − and broadcasts iη
in sΓ . Received ( 1, , )i i lη = ⋅⋅⋅ , arbitrary ( 1, , )iU i l= ⋅⋅⋅  can compute 
1
 mod 
l
s i
i
s qη
=
= ∑
The result ring signature generated by the authorized subset sΓ ∈Γ  for message m  is 
1 1( ) ( , , , , , )dm m c s sσ = Γ ⋅⋅⋅ .
2.3. Verify
For 1, ,i d= ⋅⋅⋅ , the verifier computes in turn '  mod i is ci iz g Y p=  and 1 1( , , , , ')i d ic H Y Y m z+ = ⋅⋅ ⋅ .
The verifier checks the equality 
?
1 1( , , , , ')d dc H Y Y m z= ⋅⋅⋅ . If the equality holds, the verifier accepts the 
ring signature, otherwise rejects it. 
3. Security analysis 
The proposed biometric ring signature scheme consists of two main steps. In step 1, the user enrolls 
and generates his/her private key by finger vein. In step 2, the ring signature is generated by the 
corporation of the members of the signing subset by their biometric private keys. We can also analyze the 
security of the scheme from the two sides. 
On the one hand, suppose the attacker uses many finger vein images to attack the system, it is very 
hard to succeed because the uniqueness of the finger vein. If the attacker attacks the system by directly 
generating the FVCode for the error-correcting, under the assumption adopting (4096, 506, 382) BCH 
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code, he/she must generate 4096 bits in which 382 bits are permit to be wrong. The successful possibility 
can be calculated as: 382 4096 37142 2− −= . As the length of key is 506, the possibility of generating the real 
private key directly to attack the system is 5062− .
On the other hand, once we get the secure biometric private keys, we can use the same security 
analysis methods as in [our]. It consists of three aspects: correctness, anonymity and unforgeability. Due 
to space limitations, the details of the proof of above theorems please refer to [6]. 
4. Conclusion 
Combining biometric features and cryptography, an authorized subset oriented biometric ring signature 
scheme is proposed in this paper. Each member of the group can generate his/her signing private key with 
the help of his/her finger vein identity. Using other member’s public keys, the signing subset can 
spontaneously construct a set of subsets, namely access structure, and then generates the ring signature on 
behalf of the access structure. The verifier can verify if the ring signature is generated by one authorized 
subset in the access structure, however he cannot find out which authorized subset has really issued the 
signature. The analysis results show that the generated biometric keys are hard to attack and the ring 
signature is unforgeable and anonymous.  
In the future work, we will research how to enhance the performance of generating the signing 
biometric keys and how to enhance the robustness of the signature scheme. 
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